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Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphalia
TOM GINSBURG*
INTRODUCTION
For at least three decades, it has been quite common in the United
States to talk of the coming of the Asian century. Since the publication
in 1979 of Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One,1 Americans have been
fascinated with the rise of Japan and then China, and the corresponding
reports of the decline of the United States. This psychology may have
intensified with the 2008-09 financial crisis and the understanding that
China is now playing a central role in assuring global financial, and
thereby political, stability. Notwithstanding some Orientalist hyperbole,
there is no doubt that Asia has been, and will continue to be, a region of
rising power, responsible for an increasing share of world output,
innovation, and power, even as the United States declines in relative
terms.
What will the rise of Asia mean for global governance? Oddly, I
believe that any "Eastphalian" world order will mean a return to
Westphalia, at least as modern international lawyers understand the
term. Drawing its name from the 1648 treaties ending the Thirty Years'
War and the Eighty Years' War, Westphalia stands for principles of
mutual noninterference, an emphasis on sovereignty, and formal
equality of states. Eastphalia, should it materialize, will emphasize
similar structures, putting an end to the brief interlude of European
universalism and global constitutionalism that intensified after the
Second World War. 2
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Director, Center on Law and
Globalization, American Bar Foundation. I would like to thank Shinichi Ago, Simon
Chesterman, David Fidler, Toshiki Mogami, and Hisashi Owada for helpful comments and
discussions. I would also like to thank Jianlin Chen and Joseph Parish for helpful
research assistance.
1. EzRA VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA (1979).
2. Apparently there was a historical "Eastphalia" (German: Ostfalen) corresponding
to Westphalia or Westfalen. Ostfalen, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostfalen (last visited
Aug. 31, 2009). Thanks to Shinichi Ago for pointing this out.
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Universalism has driven the great development of the human rights
movement and the establishment of an infrastructure of global
institutions. Global constitutionalism has inspired increasingly
numerous attempts to reach into policy realms previously considered
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state and, in the European case, a
shift to supermajority rather than unanimity as a basis of
intergovernmental decision-making. But Asian countries have not been
leaders in either of these movements. Instead, they have reacted
cautiously and have emphasized the traditional concerns of sovereignty
and noninterference. There is little sign that this approach will change
radically, even as economic and political power continues to shift to the
proverbial East.
It is often argued that the European Union is somehow the future of
global governance.3 As Slaughter and Burke-White put it, 'The Treaty of
Westphalia... has given way to the Treaty of Rome."4 European nations
embody the Kantian "democratic peace," having replaced the battlefield
with a marketplace. Europe, we are told, has given up the retrograde
nation-state ideology in favor of a technocratic super-state of ever-
widening scope. The strong implication is that where Europe goes, the
world will follow, once sufficiently enlightened. This claim seems
incompatible with Asian economic trajectories and the recent history of
internationalism in the Asian region. Only if Asia's political preferences
and infant regional institutions magically transformed into mirrors of
Europe would we expect an Asia-centered economic order to converge
with the European model of politics and law. This outcome seems highly
unlikely, as this essay will argue.
At the same time, an Eastphalian revival of supposedly outdated
notions of sovereignty has the potential to further the never-realized
promise of Westphalia-a reduction in international conflict. As has
long been recognized, the liberal international order has interventionist
tendencies that may, in fact, be conflict generating. This tendency is
particularly true under the universalist vision associated with the
United States. Asian respect for sovereignty may, thus, lead to a
reduction in international conflict, even though it bodes poorly for
international critiques of human rights practices in authoritarian
states.
To be sure, there is no guarantee that an Eastphalian order will
emerge. In the latter part of this essay, I consider the probability of an
Eastphalian order arising, and find it unlikely. Even if Asia dominates
3. See, e.g., MARK LEONARD, WHY EUROPE WILL RUN THE 21ST CENTURY 3-4 (2005);
Anne Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. IN'L L.J. 327, 329 (2006).
4. Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 3, at 331.
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the world economically, the presence of other powers and the non-
universalist tradition of Asian international relations mean that Asian
preferences with respect to the structures of international interaction
will not necessarily dominate. It is also possible that Asian preferences,
as exhibited in the behavior of states, may converge with those of
European internationalists. In my view, however, the most likely
scenario for international law and order in the twenty-first century is
neither a complete "Eastphalian" return to Westphalia nor a
universalistic, transgovernmental dialogue of the type championed by
Professor Slaughter. Instead, the likely outcome is a complex struggle in
which universalism coexists with a continuing emphasis on sovereignty,
with Asian nations weighing on the latter side for the most part.
I. THE EULOGIES FOR WESTPHALIA AND THE RISE OF ASIA
A. The Rise and Fall of Westphalia
The conventional story of modern international law begins with the
Peace of Westphalia, in which warring European princes collectively
created international order out of the primordial deep. In a large-scale
diplomatic conference, these princes ended the Thirty Years' War in the
Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the
Netherlands. The series of treaties they concluded provided a
framework in which states could agree to disagree, thereby resolving
seemingly interminable conflicts over religion that had divided Europe
since the Protestant Reformation. Westphalia is usually seen as
standing for the principle of sovereignty, in which each prince could
choose the religion of his jurisdiction, guaranteeing minority Christian
sects the right to practice their own faith.
5
Westphalia's sovereignty principle has several components. First,
states are formally equal. Each sovereign is the highest authority in its
own jurisdiction, unable to judge other sovereigns, and, thus, is
obligated to deal with other sovereigns as equals. Second, sovereignty is
internally and externally directed. Each state is free to choose its own
mode of governance, and that choice is entitled to respect and
noninterference from other states. Third, states are the primary actors
in the international system, and it is on their consent that international
5. Note that the guarantee of minority religious practice itself made domestic affairs
the subject of international concern, in contrast with the image of Westphalia as
maximizing sovereignty. That the actual system of Westphalia undercut what it is seen to
stand for is beside the point. We are interested in the understanding of Westphalia and
the idea of sovereignty as an organizing principle for international affairs. See generally
STEVEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
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order rests. These principles formed the basis of the international
political, economic, and legal system for the subsequent three centuries.
It must be made clear at the outset that Westphalia hardly ushered
in the era of global peace that its architects imagined. Europe continued
to engage in wars of great brutality and scope. Even when not at war at
home, European nations engaged in a race of conquest that transformed
the globe and displaced alternative systems of international relations
that were as conceptually developed as that of Europe.6 Eventually,
decolonization led to the export of the model of the territorial nation-
state, but this development generated a new series of conflicts between,
and especially within, new states as various groups sought to
consolidate authority. It is not too much to say that Westphalia stood for
peace in theory and war in practice. Perhaps, for this reason,
Westphalian ideas began to erode in the twentieth century.
It is a commonplace notion that Westphalian sovereignty has been
diminished by the post-war system of the United Nations and its
associated human rights instruments that purport to make domestic
treatment of citizens a matter of international concern. 7 For the first
time, the international system as a whole identified human rights as a
central goal of global institutions. Led by the United States, liberal
internationalism involved opening up states to outside scrutiny. But,
the U.N. Charter itself reflected a split. While the Charter emphasized
human rights, article 2(7) contained a Westphalian caveat: "Nothing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter..." While the
protection of human rights was a normative goal of the system, the
actual operating system of international law continued to emphasize
state consent, noninterference, and sovereign equality.'
0
Since the end of the Cold War, reports of the death of Westphalia
have increased in frequency and intensity. It has often been asserted
that the erosion of Westphalian sovereignty is increasing with
globalization. Virtually every writer on globalized governance claims
that it spells the death, or at least the weakening, of Westphalia.
I I
6. R.P. ANAND, DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIA (2005).
7. See generally JOSEPH CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992).
8. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1994).
9. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
10. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 25-26; see also CHARLOTTE Ku & PAUL DIEHL, THE
DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming Feb. 2010).
11. See BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995); ANDREW LINKLATER,
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International institutions, such as the International Criminal Court
(ICC), the human rights treaty bodies, and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), have infringed on policy areas previously
considered national prerogatives. Regional organizations, of which the
European Union (EU) is the paradigm, have transformed nominally
sovereign nations into members of regional blocs, and the WTO is
asserted to constitutionalize economic globalization at the multilateral
level. 12 Nongovernmental organizations and corporations, as well as
individuals, have gained personality on the international plane. All this,
it is claimed, calls for new thinking and the discarding of sovereignty as
an outmoded concept.
What might the international order of the future look like? Anne-
Marie Slaughter argues that we are already in a New World Order in
which the key decisions are not made by states pursuing their national
interests but by networks of state bureaucrats and judges interacting
with each other across borders to make and enforce rules.1 3 Intensified
cross-border activity creates greater demand for governmental
coordination across borders. Slaughter's view is that Europe, with its
cross-border integration and networks of technocratic committees, is a
model and a harbinger for the rest of the world. Others see the new
possibility of global democracy, with constitutionalist overtones.14 In
this view, global governance projects will increasingly tend toward
limitation on state prerogatives and protection of the individual, much
as domestic constitutional orders provide for a limited government and
fulfillment of individual rights.
B. The Asia Problem
It is hard to say exactly how these images of global technocracy or
democracy interact with another widely accepted assumption: Asia is
going to be the center of the next phase of world order. When examined
in detail, sovereignty-eroding international institutions enjoy much less
consensus than many otherwise think. The record of South, Southeast,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-
WESTPHALIAN ERA (1998); Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and
the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT'L ORG. 251 (2001); Gilles Paquet, The New Governance,
Subsidiary, and the Strategic State, in GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 183 (2001);
Kimon Valaskakis, Long-term Trends in Global Governance: From "Westphalia" to
"Seattle,"in GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 45 (2001).
12. DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE 236 (2008).
13. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE NEW WORLD ORDER 16 (2004).
14. See, e.g., COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY: AN AGENDA FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER
(Danielle Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995).
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and Northeast Asia in international law has been one of caution and
even resistance to the notion of global constitutionalism, even as Asian
powers have provided leadership in certain areas of substantive
international law. In forum upon forum, the Asian powers call for
restraint, sovereignty, and noninterference. One also sees in Asia limits
to regionalism and institutionalization, and less acceptance of an active
role for nonstate actors. 15 Asia, thus, stands as a conservatizing player
in the international scene.
Take some of the prominent institutions of global governance. The
paradigm case is the ICC, whose 110 state parties include relatively few16
from Asia. As of July 21, 2009, using the categorization of the U.N.
General Assembly Regional Groupings, there were thirty state parties
from Africa, twenty-five from Western Europe, twenty-three from Latin
America, sixteen from Eastern Europe, and fourteen from Asia, making
Asia the least "cooperative" region. And neither of the big emerging
Asian powers, China and India, is an ICC member. By contrast, Asia is
the single largest group in the General Assembly with fifty-three states.
Only twenty-six percent of Asian states are ICC parties, as compared to
ninety-two percent of Western European and seventy percent of Latin
American countries. The recent ICC arrest warrant issued for Sudan's
President Omar Al-Bashir was greeted by a negative reaction from
China, the Middle East, and the African Union nations, suggesting that
the consensus on the warrant may be thinner than one would otherwise
think. No Asian state defended the ICC prosecutor's position.
It is true that Asian states have been as willing as any to sign on to
the global human rights instruments, but those are relatively
undemanding of their signatories. Asia remains the only major region of
the world without a regional human rights court, though the members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have just
inaugurated a relatively toothless Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights. Although individual Asian countries have begun to
create national human rights commissions, discourse in the region
retains a strong sovereigntist tone.
These observations are not a claim that Asian countries and Asians
have made no contributions to international law. That claim would
surely be wrong. In trade, Asian countries have been major players,
increasingly utilizing the WTO dispute resolution system. Individual
Asian jurists have led the ICC, the International Court of Justice, and
15. Miles Kahler, Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case, 54 INT'L ORG. 549,
549-50 (2000).
16. For the current list of state parties to the ICC, see ICC - The State Parties to the
Rome Statute, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties (last visited Sept. 26,
2009).
EASTPHALIA AS THE PERFECTION OF WESTPHALIA
the Appellate Body of the WTO. Asian countries have pushed for a
number of important international law doctrines, in areas such as the
Law of the Sea and principle of self-determination. But these
innovations have not been sovereignty eroding. In some sense, they
stand for the classical Westphalian ideals of a realm of consent-based
law to regulate interactions among states.
In domestic governance, Asian countries are hardly in the lead with
regard to making blanket constitutional commitments to international
treaties or the operation of customary international law. Japanese
courts, for example, will apply rules of customary international law
directly, but only if they are sufficiently clear. 17 In this sense, they have
been no more international than the dreaded United States Supreme
Court, often portrayed as a bastion of parochialism.' 8 Chinese scholars
have asserted that customary international law does not apply in
China's domestic legal order. Domestic application of treaties has
hardly been robust in either China or Japan.
2
The greatest conceptual innovation of Asian states in international
law in the past several decades has been a regressive one, namely the
idea that "Asian values" offered an alternative to liberal universalism.
2 1
In reaction to criticism from human rights advocates, Asian states
launched a countervailing discourse, most notably in the Bangkok
Declaration of 1993. Asians, we were told, value order over freedom, the
group over the individual, and economic development over political
liberties. 22 It is difficult to evaluate the veracity of these claims, made
as they typically were by representatives of illiberal governments, who
evoked Orientalist imagery of complacent populations comfortable with
hierarchy. Certainly there is room to acknowledge competing traditions
of thinking about rights and their analogues in Asia.2 3 Whether one
believes that the governments advancing Asian values are acting in
good faith as representatives of their populations, it is clear that a
17. See YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW 78
(1998) (citing Siberia Internment case, 811 HANREI TAIMUzu 76 (Tokyo High Court, Mar.
5, 1993)); see also Thomas Franck & Arun Thiruvengadam, International Law and
Constitution-Making, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 467, 495 (2003).
18. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-28 (2004). On American judicial
provincialism, see Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 4 (1995).
19. Franck & Thiruvengadam, supra note 17, at 500.
20. See IWASAWA, supra note 17, at 37-44; Hanqin Xue & Qian Jin, International
Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System, 8 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 299, 302-05 (2009).
21. See DANIEL BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 52-83 (2006); THE EAST ASIAN
CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 27-102 (Joanne Bauer & Daniel Bell eds., 1999).
22. KISHORE MAHBUBANI, CAN ASIANS THINK? 47-101 (3d. ed. 2004).
23. For an excellent consideration of this issue, see Elizabeth J. Perry, Chinese
Conceptions of Rights: From Mencius to Mao--and Now, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 37 (2008).
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corollary of the approach is to emphasize transnational dialogues and
negotiations on rights, with implementation and enforcement left
strictly to the domestic level.24 The debate provides clues as to what an
international order dominated or heavily influenced by Asian
governments would look like: oriented toward economic growth and
development, socially conservative, and politically tolerant of domestic
repression of the individual in the name of the public good.
Beyond this, Asian nations have resisted external attempts to
internationalize treatment of their own populations. For example, China
treats any criticism of its behavior in Tibet or Xinjiang as international
meddling. In the official Chinese view, human rights are well and good,
but they should not lead to external critique of matters within China's
domestic jurisdiction. As discussed below, the members of ASEAN have
also been fairly consistent on their insistence on no external
interference into matters reserved for domestic jurisdiction. In short,
Asian countries do not seem to be major proponents of global
governance that undermines national sovereignty, particularly not in
spheres related to human rights. Instead, the emphasis is on sovereign
prerogatives and noninterference.
The Asian position makes sense given structural and historical
dynamics in the region and reflects suspicion of the motives of Western
critics of Asian practices. One can see in this emphasis a post-colonial
sensibility. 2 5 In an environment of decolonization, new states in Asia
focused their attention on the prerogatives of state-building. The Asian
position was decisively articulated by India, China and Burma in 1954
under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: (1) mutual respect
for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3)
mutual noninterference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual• 27
benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence. These principles were reiterated
at the Bandung Summit on Afro-Asian Solidarity in 1955, an important
forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement. 28 In turn, these principles
24. See Sienho Yee, The Role of Law in the Formation of Regional Perspectives in
Human Rights and Regional Systems in the Protection of Human Rights: The European
and Asian Models as illustrations, 8 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 157, 162-63 (2004).
25. Diane A. Desierto, Postcolonial International Law Discourses on Regional
Developments in South and Southeast Asia (Aug. 2, 2009) (unpublished paper, available at
http://www.asiansil-tokyo2009.com/pdf/A-3/DIANE%20A.%20DESIERTO.pdf).
26. Zhou Gang, The Establishment of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and its
Historical Contributions, 72 FOREIGN AFF. J. (2005), available at http://www.cpifa.orgt
EN/Html/2005122172937- 1.html.
27. ANAND, supra note 6, at 101.
28. XV Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement,
History and Evolution, http://www.namegypt.org/en/AboutName/HistoryAndEvolution/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
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provided inspiration for the founding documents of the regional
communities in South and Southeast Asia. But the principles are
essentially Westphalian in character. In short, just as the Western
powers turned toward global institutions and integration, nascent Asian
countries and powers were asserting their sovereignty and the
importance of noninterference in domestic matters.
C. Regionalism?
What about the regional option? Many commentators have predicted
that the world will become one of regional blocs, embodied in• 29
organizations. If Asian countries emphasize national sovereignty over
universalist principles, perhaps they would prefer closer regional
cooperation. But regionalism, too, is most developed in Europe where
the European Convention of Human Rights and the EU have created a
quasi-federalist constitutional order. The evidence is that Europe is
actually the exception, not the vanguard, in the new world order.
Regionalism nowhere else shows signs of being as vigorous, especially in
the human rights field. The Inter-American Human Rights system has
made important contributions to international jurisprudence, but it is
woefully underfunded. 30 Indeed, it would probably collapse without
funding from the EU. The various regional trade blocs in Latin America
are deepening, but they are also fragmenting. 3 1 African regionalism is
nascent and, to this point, more formal than substantive.
Now consider Asia. East Asia is the home of the paradigmatic
nation-states: Japan, Korea, China, and Vietnam. These nations have
histories far older than the relatively recent emergence of nation-states
in Europe. There is no history of a jus commune or a Holy Roman
Empire to inform a regional vision for the future.
32
29. JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM
(1997); Wieslaw Michalak & Richard Gibb, Trading Blocs and Multilateralism in the
World Economy, 87 ANNALS ASS'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS No. 2 264 (1997).
30. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-Am. C.H.R.), Annual
Report, at ch. 2(I), Inter-Am C.H.R., OEA/Ser.LV/II.134, doc 5. Rev. 1 (Feb. 25, 2009),
available at http://www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/2008eng/Chap2.a.eng.htm#Reorganization;
Paolo Carozza, President, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Remarks at the Inaugural Session of the
133rd Regular Period of Session of the IACHR (Oct. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Discursos/10.20.08.eng.htm.
31. See Final Declaration from the First Cuba-Venezuela Meeting for the Application of
the ALBA, VENEZUELANALYSIS, Apr. 30, 2005, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/
analysis/1097 (describing the results of a diplomatic meeting on strengthening economic
ties under the "Agreement for a Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)").
32. R. C. VAN CAENEGAM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND FUTURE: UNITY AND
DIVERSITY OVER TWO MILLENIA (2002); REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, ROMAN LAW,
CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW: THE CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY (2001).
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Asian regionalism remains in its infancy. 33 Two decades after the
formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the
group remains largely a talking shop. It holds an annual summit that is
a must-attend event on the global diplomatic scene. But its governance
structure is minimal. Perhaps its most visible achievements are cross-
border coordination on terrorism and shipping security, issues that
serve important state interests and are hardly a harbinger of deep
integration.
The leading regional association is ASEAN. Since its founding in
1967, ASEAN has expanded to ten members and developed programs of
regional integration, embodied in the 2007 adoption of the ASEAN
Charter.34 ASEAN's program now includes a free-trade association
(FTA), though integration is not deep, given that the region's economies
are largely competitive rather than complementary. ASEAN's FTA has
no regional court, notwithstanding proposals to set one up, and has
made its most significant achievements in tariff reductions. But these
accomplishments are hardly the stuff of deep integration, and they
reflect the natural interest of states in cross-border coordination rather
than an erosion of sovereignty. The ASEAN Regional Forum is the most
developed security structure in the region, and it does provide an
important place to air issues and hold discussions. But it is hardly
institutionalized in the sense of having any independent affect on
political and security outcomes. In any case, a forum for discussion by
national leaders is emblematic of Westphalian, not universalist or
constitutionalist, thinking.
ASEAN is associated not with sovereignty-reducing integration but
with the "ASEAN Way": a process of consultation and consensus that is
identified with many of the cultures in the region. Its Charter
emphasizes the traditional principles of noninterference, sovereignty,
and independence.3 5 To be sure, the Charter calls for ASEAN's purposes
to include strengthening democracy and protecting human rights and
calls for a human rights body.37 The Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights was established as this article went to press, but
33. See Yee, supra note 24, at 163-64.
34. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Charter, Nov. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. The Charter was ratified by all ten
members and came into force by October of 2008. Press Release, ASEAN, ASEAN
Embarks on New Era - Charter Fully Ratified (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.aseansec.org/22022.htm.
35. ASEAN Charter, supra note 34, at ch. I, art. 2.2(a), (e).
36. Id., ch. I, art. 2.2(i).
37. Id., ch. I, art. 14.
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remains controversial.
38
Perhaps the greatest achievement of Asian regionalism has been the
ASEAN+3 system of financial cooperation known as the Chiang Mai
Initiative. ASEAN+3 refers to ASEAN's regular meetings,
institutionalized since 1999, with Japan, China, and South Korea. 39 The
Chiang Mai Initiative is a series of bilateral swap arrangements
through which countries promise to provide each other with currency to
address short-term liquidity problems. The Initiative is now being
multi-lateralized and might one day form a regional monetary fund.4
However, countries have not always utilized it even when opportunities
arose, and it remains unclear if it will foreshadow further integration.
4 1
Why is regionalism so apparently underdeveloped in Asia? ASEAN
has played the lead largely because the two large powers that would be
natural leaders of Asian regional integration are unable or unwilling to
play the role. China's grand strategy-articulated by Deng Xiaoping as
taoguang yanghui ("hide capacities and bide time")-has been to let
other powers take the lead. China is growing more assertive in
international and regional fora but is still not ready to create an
alternative Beijing-centered dialogue for Asia, as its internal transition
to a market economy is incomplete and will remain so for some time.
Japan has been unable to play the role of host and leader for a
variety of reasons, including the power of domestic interest groups, its
relationship with the United States, and lingering tensions with China
and other Asian countries over its behavior before and during the
Second World War. 42 Of course, Germany faced similar historical
constraints in Europe, and it effectively formed a partnership with the
French to drive European integration. What are the prospects for Japan
and China jointly leading greater integration? Japanese, Chinese, and
Korean leaders have recently met to discuss an East Asian Community,
which would not include the United States. But there seem to be
structural limits to this cooperation, and most observers view Japan and
38. Simon Roughneen, ASEAN Human Rights Body Launched Amid Controversy, THE
IRAWADDY, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.irrawaddy.orgarticle.php?arid=17051.
39. See Richard Stubbs, ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?, 42
ASIAN SURV. 440, 455 (2002) (arguing that ASEAN+3 has considerable promise as it
moves forward on multiple issues). But see Markus Hund, ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a
New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptic's Appraisal, 16 PAC. REV. 383, 406-07
(2003) (acknowledging the achievements of ASEAN+3 in financial cooperation, but
arguing that the initiative is running out of steam).
40. Hyong-kyu Chey, The Changing Political Dynamics of East Asian Financial
Cooperation: The Chiang Mai Initiative, 49 ASIAN SURV. 450, 451-52 (2009).
41. Hal Hill, Political Realignment in Southeast Asia, 172 FAR E. ECON. REV. 8, 13
(2009).
42. Chey, supra note 40, at 453-54.
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China as rivals as much as they are partners.
43
The EU's formation grew from a grand bargain between France and
Germany. In the 1950s, Germany was the rising economic engine of
Europe, but it was unable to take the political lead for obvious reasons.
France desired political leadership and sought to bind Germany into a
common economic project to avoid a repeat of the First and Second
World Wars. These two pillars formed the European Coal and Steel
Community along with Italy and the smaller Benelux countries. From
these early seeds, the EU developed into the quasi-federalist super-state
that it is today, often spurred on by the influential European Court of
Justice.
Such a dynamic is, at present, unthinkable in Asia. In Asia, the
rising power is China and the status quo power is Japan. The two
powers have utterly different political and social systems. Neither needs
a regional organization to promote bilateral economic integration, which
is developing apace. China might one day show German-style
inclination to hide its leadership behind a regional faqade,44 but, at this
point, the political merits of a sovereignty-eroding regional arrangement
are not obvious from the point of view of either China or Japan.
European integration had a security logic as well as an economic
one. Having fought numerous wars and facing an existential threat
from the Soviet Union, the EU complemented the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Asia faces no common threat from outside the
region that might serve to incentivize integration. The largest offshore
power is the United States, hardly a security threat that might mobilize
a common bond between China and Japan.
ASEAN's regionalism is a harbinger of Asian regionalism to come.
Above all, it is sovereignty reinforcing. The vaunted policy of
noninterference has guided ASEAN from its earliest days and led to its
failure to condemn the Khmer Rouge and the Burmese generals. There
is not, and will not in the future be, a supranational court designed to
adjudicate disputes among Asian neighbors. In other words, Asia has a
Westphalian style of regionalism, in which the princes gather to discuss
mutual concerns but refrain from criticizing each other, least of all over
"internal" affairs. There is plenty of "New World Order" cooperation
among ASEAN bureaucrats, but this reality is perfectly compatible with
classical international law and a Westphalian view.
43. But see Men Honghua, East Asian Order Formation and Sino-Japanese Relations,
17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (2010) (exploring possibilities for China and Japan to
cooperate more intensively on regional integration).
44. Injoo Sohn, Learning to Co-Operate: China's Multilateral Approach to Asian
Financial Co-Operation, 194 CHINA Q. 309 (2008).
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Sovereignty-reinforcing regionalism served the interests of state-
building in an era when every Southeast Asian nation faced internal
challenges to its sovereignty, in places such as Mindanao, Karen State,
Aceh, and Songkhla. Each of the Southeast Asian states was
multiethnic in theory, while having a dominant majority in practice.
The legacy of colonial borders meant that some populations were
internally disaffected and sought some degree of autonomy or secession.
The ASEAN doctrine of noninterference meant that states refrained
from funding national liberation movements in their neighbors, and this
restraint was helpful during the phase of state-building. It is possible
that, as Asian states become more mature and secure within their
internal structures, their political outlooks will change to be more
interventionist. Perhaps a more secure and democratic ASEAN would
be more interested in critiquing Myanmar. But the signs are not strong.
The policy of constructive engagement with Myanmar has corresponded
with a decrease in leverage, as China has consolidated its position as the
main supporter of the military regime.
4 5
D. Chinese Hegemony
Will Asian attitudes change with the continued ascent of China?
Clues to this development can be found in China's foreign policy over
the last fifty years. China's consistent position has been one of
sovereignty, mutual noninterference, and refraining from criticizing
other countries for their internal behavior.46 As with Southeast Asia,
China's position was rooted in the imperatives of state-building, as well
as a desire to reunify the nation after the legacies of colonialism and
civil war.
Even if China rose to hegemonic status on the international scene, it
does not seem likely that it would emerge as an internationalist bastion.
One clue might be the traditional Chinese international order, in which
China was seen as the center of the world, with other states serving as
vassals and tributaries. The Chinese emperor was the Son of Heaven,
supreme among earthly rulers. The tribute system was one in which
45. See Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member
States of ASEAN and the President of the People's Republic of China,
http://www.aseansec.org/5476.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (reaffirming China's respect
for each country's independence and their adherence to the principle of noninterference);
see also Sudha Ramachandran, Yangon Still Under Beijing's Thumb, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
Feb. 11, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/GBllAeol.html (detailing
China's strategic support for Burma's military regime).
46. See Rone Tempest, China Changes Its Role in Recurring Scene, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28
1998, at Al, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1998/feb/28/news/mn-23871.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES
states around China were not taken over but rather were expected to
send tribute to acknowledge the suzerainty of China. In exchange, the
countries received trade privileges and some promises of protection and
mediation, as well as the status of civilized peoples. The system is of
ancient origin, but it was formalized by the Ming and Qing dynasties in
the second millennium C.E. and characterized by elaborate rituals. At
various times, the system incorporated Japan, Korea, Vietnam, the
island Kingdom of the Ryukyus, and various states in Southeast and
Central Asia.
Notably, the tributary system was not based in some universal
ideology to be imposed on other states. Rather, it was based in a notion
of cultural and civilizational superiority.4 7 Other states might be
barbarian, or might demonstrate civilizational qualities by
acknowledging the superiority of China, but there was no universalist
tradition or belief system to which all had to convert. This approach
contrasts with the international orders promoted by Islamic and
Western civilizations, which both contained strong universalist
overtones born of religious or ideological motives. The modern human
rights movement has obvious continuities with Western universalism;
China's long-standing approach to world affairs has been characterized
as realist, in which power politics matter more than promoting any
ideology.
Interestingly, the tributary system was characterized by its
bilateral character. It was not a regional council of states, with China at
the head, but rather it was a hub and spokes system with China at the
center.48 It emphasized nonintervention in the affairs of the barbarians,
as well as nonexploitation of them. This dynamic does not augur well for
an integrated China-centered Asian Union. China's current approach to
international affairs has deep historical and ideological roots, and the
presumption must be that these will persevere.
A China-centered world, should it emerge, might be a more peaceful
one than the Europe-dominated world of the past few centuries. A large
power without a universalist ideology may be less prone to outbursts
like those of the United States in the past two decades, in which notions
of humanitarian intervention and regime change have led to greater
militarism. If international conflict is reduced, however, domestic
conflict might increase, and the supposed trend toward greater
protection of the individual will come to a halt. Surely, China's
treatment of North Korea and Myanmar, the two worst human rights
47. John K. Fairbank, Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West, 1 FAR E.
Q. 129, 129 (1942); Zhaojie Li, Traditional Chinese World Order, 1 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 20,
48 (2002).
48. Li, supra note 47, at 49.
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offenders in Asia by far, as well as its support for the regime of Omar
Al-Bashir in Sudan, are harbingers.
Any exercise in prognostication is dangerous, and extrapolating
from current trends, much less ancient patterns, is always tricky. The
relations between China and Japan, the two great powers of the region,
will be a crucial determinant, and these relations could take a variety of
directions. There are countervailing trends in particular the efforts to
conceptualize an East Asian Community. But the analysis provided
above seems no less unwise than looking at Asia through the lens of
Europe.
II. SHOULD AUNG SAN Suu KYi WORRY?
WHY EASTPHALIA IS NOT INEVITABLE
Asian states have stood for application of relatively conservative
principles to guide international order, principles oddly reminiscent of
Westphalia. If this approach represents an enduring set of
commitments, an Asia-centric world would likely emphasize a return to
classical principles of state sovereignty and noninterference at the
expense of human rights and universalism. Such a world might even
have less inter-state conflict. How likely is this world to emerge? In
other words, should Aung San Suu Kyi be worried? The short answer is
"not really."
There are two possible obstacles to the vision of Eastphalia as
Westphalia articulated above. First, Asian countries may not, in fact,
become the major power bloc in the world, as the conventional wisdom
holds. The Asian century may turn out to be the multipolar century. In
keeping with the tenets of noninterference, powerful Asian states would
not necessarily undermine existing institutions, particularly those
outside Asia. Second, Asian preferences may converge with Western
ones as Asia develops economically. This possibility might lead Asians
to support the universalist visions that developed in the West. I consider
each possibility in turn.
Consider the first issue. Is it so clear that Asia will be the primary
force in world affairs? Most observers assume that an Asia-centered
world order will be a China-dominated one. But China, in particular,
faces daunting political, social, and environmental obstacles that might
impede its ability to provide effective regional or global leadership. The
projections of a China-dominated world may be subject to the same fate
49. See, e.g., EAST AsIAN REGIONALISM FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Tamio Nakamura
ed., 2009) (examining the features of regionalism from a comparative perspective and
proposing a framework for an East Asian Community including a charter and the
fundamental principles for regional cooperation in East Asia).
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as the prognostications of the last century, when various analysts
predicted that Sri Lanka would be a major developing country; that
Japan would dominate the twenty-first century; that the Southeast
Asian governments were too undisciplined to promote economic growth;
and that a world food crisis would occur in the 1970s and 1980s.
These doubts about the likelihood of Chinese hegemony may be
particularly salient given the presence of other large powers in Asia,
such as Japan and India, and the ASEAN collectivity. Some of these
powers and countries have chosen to become closer to China, perhaps as
a hedge against U.S. dominance.51 But it is not clear this trend would
continue if China sought to exert active dominance, given ancient
distrust of Chinese hegemony in countries such as Korea and Vietnam.
Even if China dominates Asia, many other competing forces in the
world might undermine the revival of Westphalian principles in
Eastphalia. The Middle East has a different tradition, that of a
transnational Arab nation or Muslim umma, superior to the temporal
borders of nation-states. Europe will retain its universalist traditions.
Indeed, from a conservative Eastphalian perspective of a large
dictatorship like China, the retention of robust regional human rights
institutions in Europe might be desirable precisely because they could
ameliorate pressures to make the global system stronger. The
sovereigntist model, meanwhile, might appeal to states in Africa and
the Middle East who are concerned about external cultural and political
influence. Eastphalia would, thus, involve continued regional diversity,
helping prevent any shift in the direction of sovereignty-impinging
global constitutionalism.
Second, and perhaps more likely, Asian countries could change their
preferences as they develop economically. As countries get richer, their
citizens tend to demand more democratic governance and human
rights.52 The experiences of the so-called Asian Tigers provide some
evidence in this regard. Taiwan, Korea, and Indonesia all democratized
after extended periods of economic growth under an authoritarian
regime. South Korea now has a vigorous human rights commission, and
50. Saman Kelegama, Development in Independent Sri Lanka: What Went Wrong?, 35
EcON. & POL. WKLY. 1477, 1477 (2000); see generally PAUL EHRLICH, THE POPULATION
BOMB 44 (1968); GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF
NATIONS 376-409 (1968) (discussing the impact of Southeast Asian political systems on the
development of the region); CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED
JAPAN To TAKE THE LEAD (1988); VOGEL, supra note 1 (discussing Japan's rise to
preeminence).
51. DAVID C. KANG, CHINA RISING: PEACE, POWER, AND ORDER IN EAST ASIA 54-55
(2007).
52. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR
THE REST? 39-40, 63-65 (2007).
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the nascent ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
might end up becoming an active body, despite low expectations.
53
The main question here is whether democratization will accompany
the economic rise of China. Randall Peerenboom points out that China
is, in comparative terms, still a poor to middle income country, and that
the experience of other nations has been that democratization does not
occur until a certain level of per capita income is reached. China is still
decades away from achieving this level of wealth. Once China reaches
this level, Peerenboom expects that similar democratization
developments may be possible. In this scenario, Asia may indeed come
to look more like Europe because of a genuine consensus for democratic
governance triggered by economic development.
This scenario itself emphasizes universal dynamics. The statistical
regularity with which countries seek to democratize after achieving a
particular level of wealth is, like all such statistical regularities, subject
to exceptions. Singapore, one of the world's richest countries and a
leader in articulating Asian views in international affairs, is one such
exception, being typically categorized as a semi-democracy. Whether
Singapore is the exception that proves the rule, or a harbinger of
broader trends for the twenty-first century, becomes a central analytic
issue.
Some scholars have emphasized Asia's slow but steady shift toward
global trends. The current President of the ICJ, Hisashi Owada, has
argued that the Asian nations are moving slowly and steadily toward a
universal vision of the rule of law in international affairs. Certainly
Asia's participation in a variety of global fora and leadership in certain
international institutions might suggest greater globalism. This
globalist turn might in time affect the attitudes of Asian populations,
which would then demand further internationalization by their leaders.
Some visions of the international order emphasize how small steps
can lead, and indeed do lead, toward greater cooperation. Early scholars
of the EU, such as Ernst Haas, focused on how cooperation in relatively
uncontroversial areas led to "s~illovers" that encouraged further and
further integration over time. States create institutions that then
change the preferences of the member states. In some approaches, this
53. New Regional Body Will Help Protect Human Rights in Southeast Asia, U.N. NEWS
CENTRE, July 22, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31547&Cr-
human+rights&Crl.
54. PEERENBOOM, supra note 52, at 124-25.
55. Hisashi Owada, The Rule of Law in a Globalizing World: An Asian Perspective, 8
WASH. U. GLOBAL STuD. L. REV. 187, 200-02 (2009).
56. ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 456-57 (1964).
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pattern follows a logic of path-dependency, so that the costs of further
integration decline with each shift toward cooperation. This paradigm
would predict greater institutionalization of ASEAN, and perhaps even
a broader regional organization in the future. Whether one buys this
teleological vision, it is at least a theoretical possibility that would
undermine the vision of Eastphalia described above.
Another vision drawn from the human rights literature emphasizes
the acculturation of states to norms associated with institutions.
Institutions provide fora in which state elites can be persuaded of the
merits of alternative approaches. 57  Elites can also become
"acculturated" to the importance of human rights, leading to
internalization at the state level.58 Either of these paradigms suggests
that Eastphalia would look different from Westphalia and more similar
to the universalist vision associated with global constitutionalism. The
key factor here involves the shift in preferences among populations and
their leaders toward a global convergence.
In short, Eastphalia is hardly inevitable. Obstacles remain with
regard to the continued trajectory of China, and, although in any
projection Asia will remain a very important region, it is likely to be one
among many, and unlikely 'as a matter of both inclination and power to
project its classical Westphalian vision onto other players in the
international scene. 59 Even if East Asia emerges as the single dominant
region of the world, a convergence in preferences may also occur such
that Eastphalia reflects current European trends toward global
constitutionalism.
CONCLUSION
The world is a complex and unpredictable place, and predictions
should be made with caution. Prognosticators of the international scene
have focused on two claims on which there is broad agreement: First,
globalization is producing deep integration among nations that will be
accompanied by quasi-constitutional global governance; and, second,
Asia will significantly influence the world in decades to come. These two
claims are in tension with each other. Asian countries have hardly been
57. RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAw (forthcoming 2010).
58. Id. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE
L.J. 975, 977 (2005).
59. To be sure, it may be less a matter of projection than competition. The U.S. and the
European nations will have to compete with growing Asian influence, power, and
preferences in some places, such as the Middle East and Africa, where the sovereigntist
vision is likely to be more attractive than the Western one.
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leaders in deep integration of the constitutionalist variety, though they
have been effective participants in globalized markets. Projecting
forward, one expects an Asia-dominated world to emphasize traditional
concerns of sovereignty, noninterference, and mutual cooperation rather
than the constitutionalist vision of supranational institutions reaching
deep into the way states govern themselves and treat their own
populations. Eastphalia may be Westphalia without the universalism-
a kinder, gentler Westphalia. In this vision, the claim of Asian
dominance turns out to be correct, while the claim of global
constitutionalism proves to be wrong.
Things could turn out differently. Perhaps Asia will not be the
center of the twenty-first century world. Certainly, plenty of potential
obstacles might change current economic trends and the record of
prognostication about the region has hardly been stellar, as Vogel's
quaint title Japan as Number One highlights. In this vision, then, global
constitutionalism may come to pass, and the Treaty of Westphalia may
indeed be replaced by the Treaty of Rome on a global scale.
Finally, both claims, that of global constitutionalization and that of
Asian dominance, may be compatible. This possibility would require an
acceleration of integration in Asia itself and the adoption of a set of
norms and preferences among peoples of the region that is compatible
with the constitutionalist vision. It is a vision of convergence, in which
Asian values become European values and vice versa. It is a vision that
Aung San Suu Kyi could live with, as could many of us.

